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Wepresent amodeling framework for analyzing if theuse of interruptible transportation services can improve
capacity utilization in a natural gas transportation network. The network consists of two decision makers:
the transmission system operator (TSO) and a shipper of natural gas. The TSO is responsible for the routing
of gas in the network and allocates capacity to the shipper to ensure that the security of supply in the
network is within given bounds. The TSO can offer two different types of transportation services: ﬁrm and
interruptible. Only ﬁrm services have a security of supplymeasure, while the interruptible services can freely
be interrupted whenever the available capacity in the transportation network is not suﬃciently large. We
apply our modeling framework on a case study with realistic data from the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The
results indicate substantial increased throughput and proﬁts with the introduction of interruptible services.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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0. Introduction
In this paper we discuss whether the introduction of interruptible
ransportation services in anatural gas network can increase through-
ut without deteriorating the security of supply. In our modeling
ramework we include both ﬁrm and interruptible transportation
ervices, where ﬁrm services are characterized by a guaranteed level
f security of supply while interruptible services are delivered pro-
ided there is available capacity on the given day. We present a gen-
ral model framework and a case study based on realistic data from
he Norwegian natural gas transportation system that covers nearly
0 percent of European gas consumption (Norwegian Petroleum Di-
ectorate, 2012).
Interruptible transportation services are well known within the
atural gas supply chain, as they are available in the US and in several
uropean systems (including the Norwegian). These services allow
he TSO to oversell the capacity by reselling capacity that is booked
rmbutnotnominatedwithout relieving theobligation to theoriginal
uyer, as described in Doane, McAfee, Nayyar, and Williams (2008).
t is usually required that all ﬁrm capacity, deﬁned by a predeﬁned
tatic limit, is sold before any capacity can be resold as interruptible.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 92616498.
E-mail addresses:Marte.Fodstad@sintef.no (M. Fodstad), Kjetil.Midthun@sintef.no
K. T. Midthun), Asgeir.Tomasgard@iot.ntnu.no (A. Tomasgard).
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377-2217/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undhe intention of the interruptible services is to improve the short term
edistribution of transportation capacity to support an eﬃcient use of
he network (Ruff, 2012). Our motivation for introducing interrupt-
ble transportation services is different. We focus on increasing the
apacity initiallymade available by the TSO rather than redistribution
f allocated capacity between the producers. The latter will increase
he utilization of the offered capacity in the network,while the former
ill increase the capacity offered. This implies a slightly different def-
nition since we discuss interruptible contracts in a primary market
ithout any assumption on resale. We are not aware of any natural
as networkor examples in the literaturewhere interruptible services
re used for this purpose.
A high level of security of supply is important on the market side,
or the shippers to be able to deliver in long-term contracts. It is also
mportant on the production side, to ensure that the oil production on
he ﬁelds with associated gas will not be decreased. In order to main-
ain a high level of security of supply on ﬁrm services, it is necessary
or the system operator to withhold some capacity in the system at
he time of booking to have ﬂexibility to handle uncertainties in the
nal operation. Thiswithheld ﬂexibility can decrease the capacity uti-
ization in the network. Security of supply can be expressed through
ifferent measures. Within the power sector the N-1 method, re-
uiring feasible operation even if one element in the network goes
own, is a traditional way of providing robustness in case of con-
ingencies (see for instance Vournas, 2001). Bopp, Kannan, Palocsay,
nd Stevens (1996) use a set of business rules to achieve satisfactoryer the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Fig. 1. Illustrationof thedecision sequence for a shipper and the TSO. The squares show
the decisions that are made at each point, while the trapezoids show the uncertain
parameters at that stage.
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asecurity of supply when optimizing the planning problem of a local
natural gas distribution company. Guldmann and Wang (1999) in-
cludea curtailment cost onnot satisﬁeddemand for a similar problem.
In the stochastic programming literature a variety of risk measures
are presented (see for example Rockafellar, 2007), but so far these are
rarely applied in natural gas applications. We deﬁne the security of
supply level as the expected throughput in the whole system relative
to the total ﬁrm booking:
Security of supply =
∑
s∈Scenarios
Probabilitys
∑
i∈Nodes Flowis∑
iNodes Bookingis
(1)
This is the same deﬁnition as used by Hellemo, Midthun, Tomasgard,
andWerner (2013), but in contrast to themwe also report numerical
analysis.
Unplanned events, such as outages and technical failure, cause
uncertainty in the available capacity in the transportation network.
Furthermore, the system operator must take into account system ef-
fects that make it impossible to a priori determine ﬁxed capacities
(see Midthun, Bjørndal, & Tomasgard, 2009). This corresponds to the
arguments by Vazquez, Hallack, and Glachant (2012) who point out
that the shipper’s simpliﬁed viewon the transportation network, only
acting in accordance with entry and exit booking points, requires the
TSO towithhold some capacity tomatch the booking obligationswith
the physical network capabilities.
The short-term system ﬂexibility comes from the possibil-
ity to increase production levels in some ﬁelds, to reroute the
gas, and from the storage capabilities in the pipelines (linepack).
Midthun, Nowak, and Tomasgard (2007) and Keyaerts, Hallack,
Glachant, and D’haeseleer (2011) show that linepack also has a
commercial value that introduces a trade-off in relation to secu-
rity of supply. We have not included linepack and this trade-off
in our analysis to limit the model complexity and to focus the
analysis on effects of interruptible contracts. In our single-period
model the availability of linepack would have increased the net-
work capacity that could reduce the value of introducing inter-
ruptible services, while in a realistic dynamic setting this effect
would highly depend on the time structure of network events
and the trade-off between commercial use and security of supply
considerations.
Modeling the physics of gas transportation in pipeline networks
is challenging, mainly due to nonlinear properties in pressure dy-
namics in pipelines, compressor eﬃciency and gas quality manage-
ment. Martin, Möller, and Moritz (2006) and Tomasgard, Rømo, Fod-
stad, and Midthun (2007) optimizes a steady-state representation
of gas network pressures and ﬂows. Moritz (2007) models transient
ﬂows, while Ulstein, Nygreen, and Sagli (2007), Selot, Kuok, Robinson,
Mason, and Barton (2008) and Li, Armagan, Tomasgard, and Barton
(2011) model gas quality issues. We use a linear steady-state approx-
imation of the pressure dynamics in pipelines. We assume a homo-
geneous gas quality, and thereby avoid the nonlinearities from gas
quality management. This assumption is a reasonable approximation
in networks with small quality variations, for instance downstream
of processing, but it is otherwise a simpliﬁcation.
Our contribution is both a modeling framework that allows for
detailed analysis of interruptible services to address uncertainty in
network capacity availability in the natural gas transportation net-
work, aswell as a case study based on realistic data and topology from
the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). In addition, we introduce a
new production cost function for natural gas ﬁelds that takes into ac-
count associated oil production. Our models are based on stochastic
programming and do not include strategic behavior of the partici-
pants. The validity of this will be discussed in further detail when we
introduce our models.
In Section 2 we describe in more detail the decision sequence
as well as some of our assumptions. We then present the modelingramework in Section 3, before we move on to the case study in
ection 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
. Problem statement
In this section we present the model structure and discuss the
nderlying assumptions. In our model framework, we establish a de-
ision sequence involving the agents in the supply chain (see Fig. 1).
t t = 1 the shippers submit their booking requests under the un-
ertainty of available ﬁrm capacity and at t = 2 the TSO allocates the
apacity between the shippers. The TSO tries to minimize the devia-
ionbetween requestedbookingandallocated capacitywhilemeeting
he security of supply requirements (see Eq. (1)). At t = 3, when the
llocated ﬁrm booking is known by the shippers, they book interrupt-
ble capacity. The interruptible capacity is unlimited, but the shippers
ill include the probability of interruptions when making booking
ecisions. At t = 4 uncertainty regarding network events and market
rices are resolved. The TSO then allocates interruptions based on a
easible routing pattern. Finally, at t = 5 the shippers produce and do
hort term trades. The decision sequence we have described is simi-
ar to the one used in the current system on the NCS, apart from the
ifference in use of interruptible services.
The objective of this work is to evaluate the potential from in-
roducing interruptible transportation services for the network as a
hole, while recognizing that different agents in the system have dif-
erent incentives. The modeling has been guided by the Norwegian
ystem. We have made some important modeling choices to make
he model framework tractable and focus on the effects we intend to
nalyze:
(1) We analyze the perfect competition situation whichmeans we
can model all shippers as a single agent. It implies that any
strategic behavior that could improve a single shipper’s per-
formance, but reduce the overall supply chain performance, is
not captured. It is not clear if such gaming is present in the
transportation market on the NCS, thus we have decided to
not model gaming for our initial study. The aggregation of all
shippers into a single agent reduces the uncertainty seen by the
shippers, since themodeled shipper knows the total booking in
the system. This also means that we ﬁnd a benchmark solution
for the shipper’s proﬁts in the network when interruptible ser-
vices are introduced. This corresponds to maximizing the total
supply chain proﬁts in our model. With more than one shipper
competing for the booking capacity, the shippers’ proﬁts in the
network will be reduced (or at best stay the same) compared
to the situation when all shippers are uniﬁed to one decision
unit. The difference will depend on the rules for capacity allo-
cation between the different shippers, and is not the focus of
this paper.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the stage structure of each model and the sequence of model runs, starting with SP1 and ending with SP3. Each rounded square represents one model run,
while the squares within represent stages with associated decisions in the model. Each row represents a level of information, where the events are known in the light gray area
and market information is known in the dark gray area.
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Fig. 3. The three-stage scenario tree. In the second stage (the gray nodes) the un-
certainty with regards to network availability is revealed, while the uncertainty with
respect to market prices is revealed in the third stage (the black nodes). The network
availability and the market uncertainty are assumed to be independent of each other,
all nodes in the set S2 are therefore linked to the same set of nodes S3.(2) We model booking of ﬁrm and interruptible services by a se-
quential procedure. The reason for this is that wewant to force
the shippers to prioritize ﬁrm capacity, and provide realistic in-
centives for ﬁrm services relative to interruptible services. Ex-
isting interruptible services are available only if ﬁrm capacity is
already fully utilized,whichwe expect to be a requirement also
if interruptible services are introduced in the primary trans-
portation service market. The sequential model setup implies
that the shipper will book ﬁrm services as long as the marginal
value exceeds the ﬁrm tariff, without the option of gambling
on the future availability of cheaper interruptible services.
(3) We model the TSO and the shipper as independent agents
rather than an integrated agent even though we seek a per-
fect competition situation. This is reasonable since wemodel a
regulated TSO rather than a proﬁt maximizing TSO. The mod-
eling choice makes us able to observe how the two agents’
different objectives and access to information about different
parts of the supply chain affect the overall performance.
(4) We assume that both shipper and TSO base their expectations
of network events on statistical properties from historical ob-
servations which are common knowledge for both. We expect
this to closely resemble the real-world situation.
Booking tariffs can be set as a market driven equilibrium price
r deﬁned as a regulated ﬁxed tariff. The existing regime on NCS
se ﬁxed tariffs. These are set to cover short and long term costs
f the network and a “reasonable” rate-of-return for the investors.
egulated tariffs support the underlying principle that proﬁts on the
CS should be generated from production and sales of natural gas,
ot from the transportation network. On the other hand, this regime
s more limited on providing price signals for eﬃcient allocation of
apacity than amarket driven price. For more details, see Dahl (2001)
nd Gassco (2012).
From a shipper’s perspective it is reasonable to expect interrupt-
ble tariffs to be less than ﬁrm tariffs, but that might not be the result
hen tariffs are based on costs. For example if interruptible capacity
s seen as additional capacity “on top of” the ﬁrm capacity, the in-
erruptible capacity will typically be priced by a more expensive part
f the compressor cost curve. To keep our model in accordance withhe current regime on the NCS, we use ﬁxed tariffs and the tariffs for
nterruptible services are lower than for ﬁrm (Gassco, 2012).
. Model descriptions
This section provides a mathematical formulation of the models.
model system overview is given in Fig. 2, and the full notation is
rovided in Appendix B. The model system consists of ﬁve optimiza-
ionmodels, three shipper problems, SP1–SP3, and twomodels for the
SO, TSO1–TSO2. Among these, three models are stochastic problems,
P1, SP2 and TSO1, while two models are deterministic problems, SP3
nd TSO2. Fig. 2 shows the sequence the models are run in (from left
o right), the decisions that are taken in each model and the informa-
ion ﬂow (division into stages). The text within each box belonging
o a model describes the decisions taken by the model. Results from
ach problem except SP3 are used by all the following models, as
llustrated by the curved arcs on top. The three horizontal areas in
he illustration, white, light gray, and dark gray, indicates the infor-
ation set that each decision is based on, and corresponds to the
cenario tree illustrated in Fig. 3. The outcomes in the second stage
light gray) represent network events, s2 ∈ S2 and the outcomes in
he third stage (dark gray) represent market prices, s3 ∈ S3. These
utcomes are assumed to be independent of each other and identi-
al in all the models. A scenario then consists of a combination of
n event and a price outcome. The outcomes have the corresponding
robabilities πs2 and πs3 .
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nIn the ﬁrst shipper problem, SP1, the producer requests booking
based on event and market outcomes and estimates of future inter-
ruptions, productionandsalesdecisions.At this stage the shipperdoes
not see the possibility to book interruptible capacity later. Based on
the booking request the TSO allocates ﬁrm capacity in TSO1. In the sec-
ond shipper problem, SP2, interruptible booking decisions are taken.
This problem is similar to SP1, except that ﬁrm capacity is given and
interruptible booking capacity is made available. When all booking is
decided and the events in the transportation network have become
known the TSO decides how much interruptible and ﬁrm capacity
he needs to interrupt in TSO2. Based on the ﬁnal available capacity
and the realizedmarket prices the shipper decides on the amounts to
produce and sell in SP3.
SP1 and SP2 are three stage quadratic stochastic programs, while
SP3 is a deterministic model that is run for all nodes in the last stage
of the scenario tree. The ﬁrst stage decision in SP1 and SP2 is capacity
booking, while in the second stage the shipper’s estimates of the
TSO’s interruption decisions are made based on the event outcomes.
The third stage is the actual operation with production and sales. SP2
and SP3 are variants of SP1, where ﬁrm booking is ﬁxed in SP2 while
both booking types are ﬁxed in SP3. SP3 is the same problem as the
last stage of SP1 and SP2.
The TSO problems use a network composed of ﬁeld nodes,
g ∈ G, market nodes, m ∈ M, intermediate nodes, i ∈ I and connect-
ingpipelines. Theﬁeldnodesandmarketnodes constitute thebooking
nodes, n ∈ N = G ∪M, that are the network nodes in the shipper’s
problems. In accordancewith the separate responsibilities of TSO and
shipper in an entry–exit system (Alonso, Olmos, & Serrano, 2010),
the shipper does not see the pipelines, but rather a fully connected
network.
3.1. First shipper problem, SP1
In SP1 interruptible booking is set to zero. This means that the
shipper does not foresee the possibility to book interruptible capacity
as hemakes his initial booking request. Thismimics themarket design
rule that interruptible capacity should only be made available if all
ﬁrm capacity is allocated.
3.1.1. Objective function
The objective of a shipper is to maximize his expected proﬁt that
is the expected income from selling gas in the spot markets less
the expected production costs and the transportation cost (booking
tariffs):
max
∑
s2∈S2
πs2
∑
s3∈S3
πs3
⎛
⎝∑
m∈M
(
Pm,s3xm,s2,s3
)−∑
g∈G
Fg
(
yg,s2,s3
)⎞⎠
−
∑
n∈N
TFnz
F
n, (2)
where Pm,s3 is the market price in market m in market outcome s3,
xm,s2,s3 is the volume sold in marketm in the scenario given by eventFig. 4. The production cost function used for the aggregated ﬁeld nodes. Looking at the left ha
increases, and this causes the negatively sloped part of the production cost function. The
The steeper the line, the higher the oil to natural gas ratio is. The positively sloped part of t
production, where increasing production level gives increasing cost. The right hand side of thutcome s2 and market outcome s3. The production cost is given by
he cost function Fg()which is a function of the production yg,s2,s3 in
eld g. The cost of ﬁrm booking is given by the tariff TFn in node n and
he booking level zFn, and these costs are independent of whether the
apacity is interrupted or not.
.1.2. Production cost
The production cost function consists of two parts, one for produc-
ionwith associatedoil, called “must-take”, andone for the swingﬁeld
roduction. The reasoning behind this is that each of the ﬁeld nodes
n our network represents a set of ﬁelds, each with different prop-
rties. In the must-take area, the natural gas is closely linked to the
il production. If the gas production is decreased, the oil production
ust also be decreased. Such a decreasewill then lead to a substantial
oss for the shipper. For the swing ﬁelds, the gas production will not
nﬂuence the oil production. We represent the production costs for
hese ﬁelds with a quadratic cost function based on a modiﬁcation of
he function provided by Golombek, Gjelsvik, and Rosendahl (1995).
e omit the logarithmic part that, in effect, provides maximum pro-
uction levels. Instead we have implemented a ﬁxed upper limit for
he production in each ﬁeld node. The production cost function is
epresented by (3)–(6) and is illustrated in Fig. 4. The production cost
or the must-take production, cMTg,s2,s3 , is modeled by a set of Q linear
onstraints:
MT
g,s2,s3
≥ CAMTg,q + CBMTg,q yg,s2,s3 g ∈ G, q ∈ Q, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3, (3)
here C
AMT
g,q and C
BMT
g,q are cost parameters for ﬁeld g and linear con-
traint q. In addition, there is the quadratic production cost function
n the swing ﬁelds:
SW
g,s2,s3
= CBSWg ySWg,s2,s3 + CCSWg ySW
2
g,s2,s3
g ∈ G, q ∈ Q, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3,
(4)
hereC
BSW
g is the costparameter for the linearpart of the cost function
n ﬁeld gwhile C
CSW
g is the cost parameter for the quadratic part of the
ost function. The production related to swing capacity in a ﬁeld is
iven by ySWg,s2,s3 which is the difference between the total production
n a node, yg,s2,s3 and the deﬁned must-take level Y
MT
g :
SW
g,s2,s3
≥ yg,s2,s3 − YMTg g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (5)
he cost function F(yg,s2,s3) is then given as:
(yg,s2,s3) = cMTg,s2,s3 + cSWg,s2,s3 g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (6)
roduction should stay within the production capacity limits:
g,s2,s3 ≤ Yg,s2 g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (7)
.1.3. Capacity booking
The shipper has to book capacity to inject gas into the network
rom theﬁeldnodes and to extract gas from thenetwork to themarket
odes. Firm capacity is booked in the ﬁrst stage and we require thatnd side of the ﬁgure, the cost of reduced oil production is decreasing as the production
different lines represent the different ﬁelds that are aggregated into the ﬁeld node.
he production cost function represents the gas production that is independent of oil
e ﬁgure illustrates the resulting production cost function that we use in our model.
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she requested booking for entry capacity in the ﬁelds should equal
he requested booking for exit capacity in the markets:
∈G
zFg =
∑
m∈M
zFm. (8)
he TSO will always allocate capacity such that the ﬁrm booking is
alanced. This is necessary to make it possible for the TSO to evaluate
he capacity in each node, which depends on the ﬂow pattern in the
ystem.
In reality the shipper has historical data and observations on net-
ork capacities and events. In our model we need to approximate
his in a transportation capacity, Hn,s2 , that depends on the event
utcomes. This is done by a preprocessing procedure described in
ppendix A. The transportation capacity is static in the sense that it
oes not take into account how the shipper’s own production and
elivery decisions affect the ﬂow patterns and thereby the capacity.
he shipper’s estimate for interruption of ﬁrm booking, a
F
n,s2
can then
e described by the difference between the transportation capacity
nd the booking z
F
n:
F
n,s2
≥ zFn − Hn,s2 n ∈ N , s2 ∈ S2. (9)
.1.4. Mass balances
Gas is sold in spot markets with perfect competition. The total
ales by the shipper are then limited by the total production:
∈G
yg,s2,s3 =
∑
m∈M
xm,s2,s3 s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3, (10)
here xm,s2,s3 is the volume sold inmarketm in event outcome s2 and
arket outcome s3. In addition, the sale in marketm is limited by the
ninterrupted booking into this node:
m,s2,s3 ≤ zFm − aFm,s2 m ∈ M, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (11)
inally, we must make sure that the uninterrupted booking is suﬃ-
ient for the production levels in the ﬁeld nodes:
g,s2,s3 ≤ zFg − aFg,s2 g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (12)
.2. First TSO problem, TSO1
The TSO allocates ﬁrm capacity to the shipper based on the book-
ng requests from SP1. The TSO seeks to satisfy the requests, but are
imited by the transportation capacities in the network and a require-
ent on expected security of supply. TSO1 is a two-stage quadratic
tochastic program, where allocations are given in the ﬁrst stage;
hile the routing decisions are made in the second stage after the
etwork capacity availability is known. The objective of this problem
s to minimize the square deviation from booking requests, such that
he allocation stays close to the requests from the shipper:
in
∑
n∈N
(
z¯Fn − zFn
)2
, (13)
here z¯Fn is the booking requests made by the shipper while z
F
n is the
llocated capacity to the shipper from the TSO. We must make sure
hat the shipper capacity allocation is no more than he requested z
F
n:
F
n ≤ zFn n ∈ N . (14)
n expectation, the security of supply should be at least R, which
orresponds to limiting theexpected interruption-to-booking-ratio to
e less than 1 − R. The security of supply is the total expected delivery
ate by the TSO over total ﬁrm booking. This limits the expected
nterruptions, which are represented by the difference between the
llocated ﬁrm bookings to a market nodem, zFm and the sum of ﬂows
j,m,s2
from nodes j to marketm:
∑
2∈S2
πs2
∑
m∈M
⎛
⎝zFm − ∑
j∈I(m)
fj,m,s2
⎞
⎠ ≤ (1 − R) ∑
m∈M
zFm. (15)e then add constraints tomake sure that the ﬂows are limited by the
llocated booking in the booking nodes (ﬁelds g and marketsm). The
etO(j)gives the nodes which are connected directly downstream to
pipeline going from node j, while the set I(j) gives the nodes that
re connected directly upstream to a pipeline in node j.∑
∈O(g)
fg,j,s2 ≤ zFg g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, (16)
∑
∈I(m)
fj,m,s2 ≤ zFm m ∈ M, s2 ∈ S2. (17)
or the intermediate nodes (that are not booking nodes)wemust take
are of the mass balance:∑
∈I(j)
fi,j,s2 =
∑
k∈O(j)
fj,k,s2 j ∈ J \N , s2 ∈ S2. (18)
he events are modeled by reduced capacities Ki,j,s2 in pipelines be-
ween nodes i and j. In ﬁelds and markets the reduced capacity is
iven by Kj,s2 :
j,i,s2 ≤ Kj,i,s2 j ∈ J , i ∈ O(j), s2 ∈ S2, (19)
∑
∈O(g)
fg,j,s2 ≤ Kg,s2 g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, (20)
∑
∈I(m)
fj,m,s2 ≤ Km,s2 m ∈ M, s2 ∈ S2. (21)
he dynamic capacity of the network depends on the pressure in
ach node, and is described through a Weymouth equation for each
ipeline. The Weymouth equation has the following form:
j,i,s2 = KWj,i
√
p2
j,s2
− p2
i,s2
j ∈ J , i ∈ O( j), s2 ∈ S2, (22)
hereKW
j,i
is theWeymouth constant for the pipeline going fromnode
to node i. This constant depends on characteristics of the pipeline
uch as diameter, length and roughness (for more details, see for
nstance Campbell (1992)). The pressure in node j in event outcome
2 is thengivenbypj,s2 . Since (22) is not linear, an outer approximation
erived by Taylor series expansion around ﬁxed pressure points PIl
nd POl is used (Rømo et al., 2009):
j,i,s2 ≤ KWj,i
(
PIl
PI2l−PO2l
pi,s2 −
POl
PI2l − PO2l
pj,s2
)
l ∈ L, s2 ∈ S2, (23)
here the set L gives the ﬁxed points used for the linearization. In
ur experience around 20 of these constraints are needed to assure
good ﬁt to the Weymouth equation. Finally, we must make sure
hat the pressure in each node j is within its upper and lower limit
Pj and Pj):
j ≤ pj,s2 ≤ Pj j ∈ J , s2 ∈ S2. (24)
.3. Second shipper problem, SP2
In SP2 the objective function in SP1 (see Eq. (2)) is extended with
nterruptible booking tariff∑
n∈N
T Inz
I
n. (25)
he main change is that the allocation of ﬁrm capacity has been done
y the TSO and is now input to the shipper’s optimization problem,
F
n. In the ﬁrst stage in this three-stage stochastic program the shipper
ecides how much interruptible capacity to book, zIn. In the second
tage the network capacity availability becomes known and ﬁnally,
n the third stage, the market prices become known.
When the network capacity availability becomes known in the
econd stage, the TSO decides upon routing and thus on howmuch of
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athe shipper’s booked capacity that must be interrupted. The shipper
estimates the event dependent interruption, an,s2 , as the difference
between the total booking and the shipper’s estimate for available
capacity in event outcome s2, Hn,s2 :
an,s2 ≥
(
z
F
n + zIn
)− Hn,s2 , n ∈ N , s2 ∈ S2. (26)
Finally, the shipper assumes that the TSOwill allocate capacities such
that the ﬁnal booking is balanced in the sense that entry (ﬁeld) ca-
pacity equals exit (market) capacity:∑
g∈G
(
z
F
g + zIg − ag,s2
) = ∑
m∈M
(
z
F
m + zIm − am,s2
)
s2 ∈ S2. (27)
We also need to include the mass balances in this problem, now
including both ﬁrm and interruptible booking. The injections and
extractions are not allowed to exceed the allocated capacity in each
booking node, that is the booked ﬁrm (zFg and z
F
m) and interruptible
capacity (zIg and z
I
m) less the estimated interruptions (ag,s2 and am,s2 ).
yg,s2,s3 ≤ zFg + zIg − ag,s2 , g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3, (28)
xSm,s2,s3 ≤ z
F
m + zIm − am,s2 , m ∈ M, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. (29)
3.4. Second TSO problem, TSO2
TSO2 is a quadratic mixed integer linear program run for each of
the event outcomes in S2. When the network capacity availability is
known, the TSO decides how much ﬁrm and interruptible capacity
that can be delivered. The allocation of ﬁrm capacity has been de-
termined in TSO1, and the interruptible booking by the shipper was
determined in SP2.
The objective is to minimize the square of interruptions weighted
by the booking tariffs. Note that this is different from minimizing
the total interrupted booking capacity. Instead of decreasing the total
available booking for the shippers, the ISO will try to maintain the
same booking pattern as before the interruptions. This is to avoid
large interruptions in parts of the network when this is possible to
avoid by evening out the interruptions.
min
∑
n∈N
(
TFna
F2
n,s2
+ T InaI
2
n,s2
)
. (30)
The TSO must then make sure that there is a balance between
ﬁrm booking zFg , interruptible booking z
I
g , interruption of ﬁrm and
interruptible capacity (aFg,s2 + aIg,s2 ) and the ﬂow fg,j,s2 in each booking
node:∑
j∈O(g)
fg,j,s2 = zFg + zIg − aFg,s2 − aIg,s2 , g ∈ G, (31)
∑
j∈I(m)
fj,m,s2 = zFm + zIm − aFm,s2 − aIm,s2 , m ∈ M. (32)
The TSO must also make sure that the interruption of capacity is not
larger than the allocated booking of ﬁrm and interruptible services:
aFn,s2 ≤ z
F
n, n ∈ N , (33)
aIn,s2 ≤ z
I
n,s2
, n ∈ N . (34)
To give ﬁrm booking priority, no ﬁrm booking should be interrupted
unless all interruptible booking in the same node is interrupted. The
two following constraints enforce this by theuseof thebinary variable
βn,s2 that is 1 if some ﬁrm booking is interrupted:
aFn,s2 ≤ z
F
nβn,s2 , n ∈ N , (35)
aIn,s2 ≥ z
I
nβn,s2 , n ∈ N . (36)
The ﬂows are limited by the capacities in the network, with con-
straints equal to (18)–(24) of TSO1.. Numerical analysis and discussion
In this section we ﬁrst present the data and the assumptions for
ur case study. We then discuss the numerical results and our main
ndings.
.1. Input data and assumptions
The topology in our case study is based on the topology on the
CS, and is illustrated in Fig. 5. The basis for the topology is given in
orwegian PetroleumDirectorate (2011),while details on production
nd transportation capacities and plans are conﬁdential and provided
y the Norwegian system operator, Gassco. Our network has a maxi-
um delivery capacity of 351 mega standard cubic meters, while the
argest daily delivery from NCS in 2011 was 361mega standard cubic
eters (Gassco, 2011). The eight ﬁelds that we use in our case study
epresent approximately 50 real ﬁelds, aggregated by region. These
ggregated ﬁelds can cover both must-take ﬁelds and swing ﬁelds,
nd the swing ﬁelds imply a larger daily production capacity than
ransportation capacity. All ﬁelds and markets are booking nodes in
he network, such that they require booking of transportation capac-
ty corresponding to their production and sale. The booking tariffs
or ﬁrm transportation capacity correspond to the real tariffs on the
CS, deﬁned individually for each booking node, and are available
t Gassco (2012). We have assumed the booking tariff for interrupt-
ble services to be half the price of ﬁrm services. The model has been
estedwith security of supply requirements, R, for ﬁrm services in the
ange from 0.99 to 1 (where 1 indicates that all ﬁrm capacity must be
elivered in all scenarios).
Real production cost data are not easily available, sowehavebased
ur estimates on different sources. The production costs of must-take
roduction are estimated based on gas-to-oil ratios in Norwegian
etroleum Directorate (2011), where larger oil share gives a larger
arginal production cost. The oil price is taken from the Norwegian
ational budget for 2012. For the production cost in the swing ﬁelds,
e have based our parameters on Golombek, Gjelsvik, and Rosendahl
1998) and Kon-Kraft (2003).
.1.1. Scenarios
We have generated price outcomes based on real spot prices from
010 to 2011 for all market hubs directly connected to the NCS
xport network, which is NPB (UK), Zeebrugge (Belgium), Gas Pool
Germany) and NetConnect (Germany). Since we only have one node
epresenting the markets in Germany, we have deﬁned the price for
hemarket node “Germany” as the average of the twoGermanmarket
ubs. The Dunkerque price is estimated as 10 percent of the GasPool
rice and 90 percent of the Zeebrugge price. The market prices are
epresented by 10 outcomes that are generated with the moment-
atching procedure described in Høyland, Kaut, andWallace (2003).
esting our model framework on multiple sets of generated market
rice outcomes showed that 10 was a suﬃcient number of outcomes
o achieve in-sample stability (Kaut, Wallace, Vladimirou, & Zenios,
007), with a standard deviation of 0.01 percent on the SP3 objective
unction value. Fig. 6 shows the prices for the 10 outcomes.
Due to lack of real data, our events are described by constructed
ata. We have deﬁned 19 events with reduced capacity, each corre-
ponding to a separate outcome. In addition, we have a default out-
ome where the system operates at full capacity. We do not consider
ultiple simultaneous events in any of the outcomes. This means
hat each event outcome only gives capacity reduction in a single
ode. The event outcomes are constructed such that all markets and
elds have capacity reduction in one outcome, while the two pro-
essing plants Kollsnes and Kårstø (in our test case a ﬁeld and an
ntermediate node, respectively) have four events each. The proba-
ility and extent of the capacity reductions are calibrated so that the
vailability corresponds to the average availability ﬁgures reported by
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Fig. 5. Topology for the NCS test case. The ovals represent ﬁelds, the circles are intermediate nodes, the rectangles are markets and the arrows are pipelines.
Fig. 6. The 10 spot price outcomes used in our analysis. The ﬁgure shows that the prices are volatile and highly correlated.
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vassco (2010, 2011). Since our ﬁeld nodes represent an aggregate of
everal smaller ﬁelds we have distinguished between ﬁeld nodes that
epresent only a few underlying ﬁelds and ﬁeld nodes that repre-
ent many. The capacity reduction is larger for ﬁeld nodes with few
nderlying ﬁelds and smaller butmore likely for ﬁeld nodeswith sev-
ral underlying ﬁelds. Table 1 lists the events with the affected node,
robability and the capacity reduction.
In total the 10 market outcomes and 20 event outcomes give a
hree-stage scenario tree with 200 scenarios.
.2. Results and discussion
The model is implemented in Mosel version 3.2.2 and solved by
press Optimizer version 22.01.10 on a 2.80 gigahertz dual core com-
uterwith4 gigabytesRAM.All problemsare solved tooptimality, and
he whole sequence of shipper and TSO problems were solved withineconds. A benchmark is calculated with the samemodel framework.
he difference is that there are no interruptible services available
n the benchmark, which also means that SP2 is superﬂuous. In the
ollowing we use the label “Without” for the benchmark solution,
hile “With” indicates tests with interruptible services. We test the
womodel setups for increasing security of supply requirements, and
ompare the effects on booking levels, total throughputs, incomes
nd costs.
.2.1. Booking levels
Our ﬁrst observation is that the total booking stays constant inde-
endent of the security of supply levelwhen interruptible services are
vailable. This can be seen in Fig. 7 where the ﬁrm booking decreases,
hile the interruptible booking increaseswith the same amount. This
bservation comes from the fact that tariffs are below the marginal
alue of capacity so that it is the shipper’s view on network capacity
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Table 1
The event outcomes thatwe use in our analysis. Only one node has a capacity reduction
in each of the outcomes. The numbers are calibrated to match the reported availability
ﬁgures from Gassco.
Outcome Node Probability Capacity reduction (percent)
0 No event 0.631 0
1 NBP 0.001 35
2 Zeebrugge 0.001 35
3 Dunkerque 0.001 35
4 Germany 0.001 35
5 AreaD 0.007 50
6 Nyhamna 0.004 75
7 Heimdal 0.007 50
8 Oseberg 0.005 70
9 AreaA 0.011 30
10 AreaB 0.013 25
11 Ekoﬁsk 0.003 100
12 Kollsnes 0.069 25
13 Kollsnes 0.020 50
14 Kollsnes 0.010 75
15 Kollsnes 0.001 100
16 Kårstø 0.076 25
17 Kårstø 0.020 50
18 Kårstø 0.010 75
19 Kårstø 0.001 100
Fig. 7. Interruptible and allocated ﬁrm booking decisions. Since there are both entry
and exit booking, total ﬂow cannot exceed half the total booking.
Fig. 8. The total expected throughput in the system. The dotted line shows the results
for the model without interruptible services, while the full line shows the results for
the model with interruptible services.
Fig. 9. The ﬁnal production cost in the ﬁelds in our model runs. The full line shows the
results when interruptible booking is available, while the dotted line is the result of
the model where interruptible booking is not available.
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ithat limits the booking. Since the shipper’s preference for transporta-
tion capacity is not reduced from SP1 to SP2 he will seek to obtain the
same total amount of capacity by increasing the interruptible book-
ing. A sensitivity analysis shows that this observation do not change
if interruptible tariff is increased to 50 percent above ﬁrm tariff.
Our second observation is that the shipperﬁnds theﬂexibility of un-
balanced booking valuable. When allowed, the shipper consistently
books nearly 90mega standard cubicmetersmore entry capacity than
exit capacity, even though it implies paying for some transportation
capacity that necessarily will be interrupted. Enforcing balance also
in the interruptible booking increases the booking and expected in-
terruption even further. This value comes from the ability to adapt to
events by substituting production with ﬁelds that are not affected by
an event. It should be noted that the tariffs are very small, <13 percent
of the average spot price, so the option cost of this ﬂexibility is very
low.
4.2.2. Total expected throughput
The allocated ﬁrm capacity is falling with increasing security of
supply level, which comes natural since increasing buffers are needed
to withstand the events. Our third observation is that the benchmark
has a falling expected throughput as the security of supply require-
ment increases, as can be observed in Fig. 8. On the other hand, ac-
cording to our fourth observation the expected throughput is insen-
sitive to the security of supply requirement when interruptible ser-
vices are available. These two last observations together conﬁrm our
hypothesis, that including interruptible services to the transporta-
tion service regime will increase the eﬃciency by enabling a larger
expected throughput in the transportation network without reduc-ng the security of supply. The expected throughput increases with
4 percent when introducing interruptible services at the lowest
ecurity of supply level (0.99), and the difference increases to over
69 percent when the security of supply requirement is 1.
.2.3. Income and costs
Resulting income shows a pattern similar to the total ﬂow, with
n increase of between 24 percent (with security of supply level of
.99) and 267 percent (with security of supply level of 1) compared to
he benchmark. Differences in average achieved spot prices are small,
hich is reasonable since both booking and interruption are allocated
efore spot prices become known. The ability to adapt to the vary-
ng spot prices is therefore limited. Our ﬁfth observation on the other
and is a dramatic increase in production cost due to decreased oil
roduction for the benchmark as security of supply increases, as can
e seen in Fig. 9. When the transportation capacity is reduced, pro-
uction of natural gas at the ﬁeld must be reduced and therefore also
he oil production. This leads to the largest changes in the benchmark
ince the transportation capacity falls below the must-take produc-
ion limits in these ﬁelds when the security of supply requirements
s high. Since we do not have real production cost functions available
here is substantial uncertainty with respect to the true monetary
ost of this decreased oil production. The proﬁt margins of oil is how-
ver substantially larger than for gas, so the shape of the production
ost functions are representative. We therefore also argue that the
mproved ability of stable oil production through introduction of in-
erruptible services is valid. The non-monotone shape of the curves
n Fig. 9 is due to our model framework with a sequence of models
ith objectives that are not fully aligned, where an early booking
r allocation decision can be non-optimal for the ﬁnal supply chain
erformance.
.2.4. Discussion of TSO behavior
In our modeling framework the TSO is a non-proﬁt agent who
inimizes the deviation between the shipper’s booking requests and
he ﬂow in the network. The shipper on the other hand is proﬁt max-
mizing. This corresponds well to the incentives of the agents in the
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Fig. 10. Comparison of proﬁt (income less production cost) from model runs with the original TSO objective functions (“Original”) and the modiﬁed TSO objective functions that
are more aligned with the producer’s objective function (“Aligned”). The left part shows results with interruptible services and the right part is without interruptible services
available.
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yorwegian system. These non-aligned objectives can however cause
neﬃciencies seen from a system perspective. The TSO do neither
ave information about spot prices nor production costs. The TSO
ight therefore give priority to a swing ﬁeld and interrupt must-take
roduction, or interrupt a high price market rather than a low price
arket.1 In the modeled booking regime, which corresponds closely
o the real Norwegian system, there is no way for the shippers to
ignal priorities between different booking nodes, which leave a risk
or ineﬃcient operation when prices or costs vary.
To test the signiﬁcance of the agents’ differing incentives on the
upply chain performance, we ran our case study with an alternative
et of TSO models where the incentives were more in line with the
hipper’s incentives. That is, the original objective functions were re-
laced with an objective where social surplus in the network were
aximized. This corresponds to an idealized situation where the TSO
as all price and production cost information. Fig. 10 compares prof-
ts with the social surplus maximizing TSO to the original formula-
ion. The sixth observation is that the proﬁts can increase if the TSO
aximizes social surplus rather than taking market signals from the
ooking requests only. With improved information, and the mandate
o act on it, the TSO can increase the proﬁts in the system. Due to in-
reased ﬂow and income there is approximately 10 percent increase
f proﬁt for security of supply requirements <0.997 when interrupt-
ble services are available. For stricter security of supply requirements
he proﬁt increases are less regular. With interruptible services the
odel where the TSO maximizes social surplus avoids withholding
ust-take production with valuable associated oil, which causes a
ajor proﬁt increase of 69 percent when security of supply is 1.
.2.5. Implications of using a three-stage model
Wehave considered two types of uncertainty in ourmodel: events
n the network and market prices. The ﬂexibility offered by the in-
erruptible services can be used to increase the throughput in the
ystem due to uncertainty regarding events. The interruptible ser-
ices also allow the shipper to have unbalanced booking which could
e valuable with volatilemarket prices.While we have demonstrated
hat the effect on throughput is indeed signiﬁcant, we have not been
ble to demonstrate any signiﬁcant value of including interruptible
ervices when unknown market prices are the only source of uncer-
ainty. This is however as expected since interruptions are allocated
efore market uncertainty is resolved in our model framework. To
nalyze the effect of interruptible services onmarket uncertainty, we
ould have to increase the number of stages in ourmodels. This is due
o the number of iterations used on the NCS to allocate ﬁrm capacity
nd the possibility to adapt the capacity allocation to market prices
s the uncertainty is gradually reduced.1 In real life operation the TSO naturally have more insight in the system than what
s provided to him through the bookings, so it is unlikely that swing production would
e given priority over must-take production in actual operation.
x. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a framework for analysis of inter-
uptible transportation services in the natural gas system. We have
lso developed a new production cost function where the effects of
educed gas production on oil production in the same ﬁeld are in-
orporated. We have tested the modeling framework on a case study
ith realistic input data, and a topology that is similar to the topology
n the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The results from our case study
how that there is a substantial gain in eﬃciency in the networkwhen
nterruptible services are introduced to address network events. Both
otal ﬂow and income in the system is drastically increased compared
o the benchmark solution where interruptible services are not avail-
ble. For the highest level of security of supply, the increase in ﬂow
nd income in the system is as large as 250 percent.
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ppendix A. Input data
In real life, a shipper bases his expectation for network capacity
vailability on historical observations and knowledge about the sys-
em. To generate the shipper’s estimates to network capacitywe have
sed an optimization model where the objective is to ﬁnd the best
ossible utilization of the network in each scenario (s2, s3) ∈ (S2,S3):
ax
∑
m∈M
Pm,s2xm,s2,s3 −
∑
g∈G
cg,s2,s3 . (A.1)
he production cost cg,s2,s3 is represented by the set Q of linear con-
traints describing must-take production as in the shipper problems
nd a constraint representing the linear production cost of swing pro-
uction.
g,s2,s3 ≥ CAMTg,q + CBMTg,q yg,s2,s3 g ∈ G, q ∈ Q, (A.2)
g,s2,s3 ≥ CBSWg
(
yg,s2,s3 − YMTg
)
g ∈ G. (A.3)
he following two constraints make sure the ﬂows correspond to
roduction and sales decisions:
g,s2,s3 =
∑
j∈O(g)
fg,j,s2,s3 g ∈ G, (A.4)
m,s2,s3 =
∑
j∈I(m)
fj,m,s2,s3 m ∈ M. (A.5)
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KThe production is limited by the production capacities as in constraint
(7) in SP1 and the ﬂows are limited by the network capacities with
constraints equal to (18)–(24) in TSO1.
The problem utilizes the TSO’s knowledge of the physical network
structure and capacities, and the shipper’s knowledge of production
costs and market prices. The problem has a hybrid objective, where
we seek to maximize throughput in the system, but with a realistic
distribution between the ﬁelds and the markets. To achieve this we
maximize sales income less production cost as deﬁned in SP1.2
For each event outcome s2 ∈ S2 we set the shipper’s estimate for
available capacity based on the market outcome sˆ3 ∈ S3 with the
largest total throughput
∑
m∈M xm,s2,s3 . This gives the following def-
inition of the estimated capacity Hn,s2 :
Hg,s2 = yg,s2,sˆ3 , g ∈ G, s2 ∈ S2, sˆ3 = argmax
s3∈S3
∑
m∈M
xm,s2,s3 , (A.6)
Hm,s2 = xm,s2,sˆ3 , m ∈ M, s2 ∈ S2, sˆ3 = argmax
s3∈S3
∑
m∈M
xm,s2,s3 . (A.7)
Appendix B. Notation
Name Description Type
g Field Index
m Market Index
n Node with transportation booking Index
j, i Nodes in general Index
s, s2, s3 Outcome Index
q Linearization of production cost function Index
J Nodes Set
I(j) Nodes with pipeline going into node j Set
O(j) Nodes with pipeline going out from node j Set
G Fields, G ⊂ J Set
M Markets,M ⊂ J Set
N Booking nodes,N = G ∪M Set
S2 Scenario nodes in second stage, event
outcomes
Set
S3 Scenario nodes in third stage, market
price outcomes
Set
Q Linear pieces in production cost function Set
πs2 Probability of event outcome Constant
πs3 Probability of market outcome Constant
R Requirement on security of supply for
ﬁrm services
Constant
Yg,s2 Production capacity (uncertain) Constant
YMTg Must-take production capacity Constant
TFn Firm tariff Constant
T In Interruptible tariff Constant
Hn,s2 Transportation capacity through node n
assumed by the shipper (uncertain)
Constant
Pm,s3 Spot price (uncertain) Constant
C
AMT
g,q Coeﬃcient of constant part of must-take
production cost
Constant
C
BMT
g,q Coeﬃcient of linear part of must-take
production cost, <0
Constant
C
BSW
g Coeﬃcient of linear part of swing
production cost
Constant
C
CSW
g Coeﬃcient of quadratic part of swing
production cost
Constant
KW
i,j
Weymouth constant Constant2 The quadratic part of the production cost is removed to avoid that production is
limited by high production costs.
M
N
NKi,j,s2 Static pipeline capacity under event Constant
Kj,s2 Static node capacity under event Constant
Pj Maximum pressure in node Constant
Pj Minimum pressure in node Constant
zFn Firm booking Variable
zIn Interruptible booking
aFn,s2 Interruption of ﬁrm capacity Variable
aIn,s2 Interruption of interruptible capacity Variable
an,s2 Total interruption of booked capacity Variable
xm,s2,s3 Spot sale Variable
yg,s2,s3 Production Variable
cMTg,s2,s3 Must take production cost Variable
cSWg,s2,s3 Swing production cost Variable
fj,jj,s2 Flow Variable
pj,s2 Pressure Variable
βn,s2 Binary variable that is 1 if ﬁrm booking is
interrupted
Variable
cg,s2,s3 Production cost Variable
f a variable is overlined in a problem description, it is a constant in
hat problem.
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